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The notion of a proof is central to all of mathematics. In the language of
formal logic, a proof is a finite sequence of inferences from a set of axioms, and any
statement one yields from such a finitistic procedure is called a theorem. For better
or for worse, this is far from the form a traditional mathematical proof takes. Mathe-
maticians write proofs that omit routine logical steps, and details deemed tangential
to the central result are often elided. These proofs are fuzzy and human-centric, and
a great amount of context is assumed on the part of the reader. While traditional
proofs are not overly symbolic or syntactic, and hence are easily understood, such
informal proofs are susceptible to logical errors – Fermat’s Last Theorem and the
Four Color Theorem being prime examples. In light of this, there has been significant
interest in producing formal proofs of mathematical theorems: proofs in which every
intermediate logical step is supplied. Drawing on ideas from Computational Logic,
Type Theory and the theory of Automated Deduction, we are able to guaranteed the
correctness of these proofs.
The formalization of mathematics is an endeavor that has enjoyed very encour-
aging progress in recent years. Major achievements include the complete formalization
of the Four Color Theorem, the Prime Number Theorem, Goedel’s Incompleteness
Theorem, the Jordan Curve Theorem (all within the past five years!). This thesis
presents our work in formalizing the meta-theory of Peter Andrews’ classical higher-
order logic Q0 in a higher-order typed lambda calculus. Our development is a com-
pletely formal one – in addition to formalizing Q0’s logical meta-theory, we have also
developed and formalized the syntactic meta-theory ofQ0. Our syntactic meta-theory
allows for the reasoning of notions such as variable occurrences, scope and variable
binding, linear replacement, etc. Our formalization is carried out in the interactive
proof assistant Coq, developed as part of the LogiCal Project in INRIA. Coq is built
upon the Calculus of Inductive Constructions, an extension of Coquand and Huet’s
seminal Calculus of Construction with support for inductive data types. As far as we
know, this thesis presents the first effort to formalize Andrews’ logical system.
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Formalization of Mathematics
1.1.1 Proofs and Truth
I was interviewed in the Israeli Radio for five minutes and I said that more
than 2000 years ago, Euclid proved that there are infinitely many primes.
Immediately the host interrupted me and asked: “Are there still infinitely
many primes?”
Noga Alon
The centrality of the notion of a proof in mathematics cannot be overstated. In
the language of formal logic, a proof is a finite sequence of inferences from a set of
axioms. Any statement one yields from this finitistic procedure is called a theorem,
and theorems are acknowledged as unequivocal mathematical truth. The finality and
permanence of a proof is what distinguishes mathematics from all other scientific
pursuits – theorems are irrefutable once established. Euclid proved in 300 BC that
for any finite set {p1, . . . pk} of primes, there exists a prime p greater than all of
them. The infinitude of primes still holds as mathematical truth today, and the same
will be true tomorrow. Such is the importance of proofs that an entire branch of
meta-mathematics and philosophy, known as Proof Theory, is devoted precisely to
the study of proof and mathematical truth. Proof theorists treat proofs as mathe-
matical objects, and reason syntactically about the power of proof and logical systems.
2Readers acquainted with theoretical computer science will know that the no-
tion of a proof is also the basis of computational complexity theory [10]. In complexity
theory, one is concerned with how efficiently a proof can be found mechanically, and
further, if the validity of proofs can be checked quickly; efficiency in both cases is
measured in terms of time and space. We recall that the complexity class P is pre-
cisely the collection of all decision problems whose proofs can be found in polynomial
time, and NP is the collection of all decision problems with polynomial-sized proofs.
The P versus NP question, which asks if the class P is equal in power to NP , has
distinguished itself as the central question in theoretical computer science for nearly
four decades now.
1.1.2 The Importance of Being Formal
What then, is a formal proof? As mentioned in the previous section, a proof is a finite
sequence of logic inferences, such as modus ponens, starting from a set of axioms,
typically Zermelo-Frankel with Choice (ZFC). This is akin to the how elementary
facts in plane geometry are established in high-school mathematics classes. However,
this is in fact far from the form a mathematical proof takes in practice. Professional
mathematicians write proofs that are fuzzy and human-centric. Pedantic details
deemed tangential to the core of the result are often conveniently elided. To further
underscore the distinction between formal proofs and proofs mathematicians write in
practice, we quote Thomas Hales [9].
Traditional mathematical proofs are written in a way to make them easily
understood by mathematicians. Routine logical steps are omitted. An
enormous amount of context is assumed on the part of the reader . . . In a
formal proof, all the intermediate logical steps are supplied. No appeal is
made to intuition, even if the translation from intuition to logic is routine.
Thus, a formal proof is less intuitive, and yet less susceptible to logical
errors.
This is the notion of a formal proof we will adopt from here on out — a formal proof
is one in which all logical steps are provided.
We bring the readers’ attention to the last sentence of the above quote, where
Hales claims that “a formal proof is less intuitive, and yet less susceptible to logical
3errors.” Setting aside for a moment doubt about the validity of such an assertion,
we point out that herein lies the motivation behind all work in the formalization of
mathematics: Formal proofs provide us with greater, if not total, confidence that a
purported theorem is indeed true.
The field of mathematics is certainly no stranger to alleged proofs of theorems
that were later found to contain logical errors. Perhaps the most famous incident in
recent years is Andrew Wiles’ proof of Fermat Last Theorem. After announcing his
proof in a dramatic series of three lectures at Cambridge University in June of 1993,
Wiles received world-wide recognition for having resolved what was undoubtedly the
biggest open question of our times, left open from the 17th century. Unfortunately,
however, a serious technical error in Wiles’ proof was uncovered not long after. Wiles
consequently spent a year fixing his proof and, with the help of his former student
Richard Taylor, Fermat’s Last Theorem was finally put to rest in September of 1994.
Readers familiar with the history of the Four Color Theorem will know that prior to
Appel and Haken’s 1976 proof, the question was twice assumed to have been settled.
Both claims turned out to be based on erroneous proofs — the first is due to Alfred
Kempe in 1879, and the second, Peter Tait in 1880. In both cases, the false proofs
were universally accepted by the mathematical community and stood unchallenged
for over a decade before a counter-example was found!
1.2 The Meta-Theory of Q0 in Coq
This thesis presents our contributions to the aforementioned efforts in the formaliza-
tion of mathematics. We present our work in formalizing the meta-theory of Peter
Andrews’ classical higher-order logic Q0 in the Calculus of Inductive Constructions.
Q0 is a minimal classical logic based on untyped lambda calculus, with all its theory
built on just five axioms and one inference rule. Our formalization is carried out in the
interactive proof assistant Coq, developed as part of the LogiCal Project in INRIA.
Coq is built upon the Calculus of Inductive Constructions, an extension of Coquand
and Huet’s seminal Calculus of Construction with support for inductive data types.
Our first contribution is a complete formalization of the primitive basis of Q0.
The core of Q0 consists of Q0 types, variables, constants and terms, definitions of log-
ical operators and syntactic abbreviations, its five axioms and the rule of inference.
4Q0’s rule of inference, Rule R, is a rule for linear replacement of terms that allows
for variable capture.
The main contribution of this thesis work is the development and formaliza-
tion of Q0’s syntactic meta-theory. While Peter Andrews is impressively meticulous
in his presentation of logical derivations in the meta-proofs of Q0, many syntactic
derivations that are arguable intuitive have been elided. However, in a completely
formal development such as ours, all derivations, be they logical or syntactic, have to
be made explicit in the formalization. Hence, we have developed and formalized in
Coq a meta-theory of Q0’s syntactic notions, including variable occurrences, binding
and scope, linear and full replacement etc. Further, we have implemented tactics
and tacticals that automate the process of searching and building proofs syntactic
properties. We are able to guarantee soundness and completeness for our tactics and
tacticals.
Last, having formalized the syntactic meta-theory of Q0 in Coq, we have since
gone on to provide formal proofs of some of the elementary meta-theorems of Q0.
This includes basic properties of equality in Q0, such as reflexivity, symmetry and
transitivity, along with restricted and generalized versions of beta- and eta-reduction
in Q0. It is our hope that this project will culminate in the proving of the Deduction
Theorem of Q0. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful effort to
formalize the meta-theory of Peter Andrews’ logic.
5Chapter 2
Type Theory
An effectively calculable function of the positive integers is a λ-definable
function of the positive integers.
Church’s Thesis
2.1 Lambda Calculus
The λ-calculus is a formal mathematical system developed to formalize and reason
about the notions of computation and computability. The Entscheidungsproblem,
German for “decision problem”, is an ideal set forth by Gottfried Leibniz in the sev-
enteenth century centered around a philosophical question which asked if there is a
way to solve all problems formulated in a universal language, such as the language
of set theory and first order predicate logic. This question was again posed by David
Hilbert in 1928 in continuation of his program initiated at the turn of the century,
and is therefore also commonly known as Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem.
The Entscheidungsproblem was answered in the negative in 1936 independently
by Alonzo Church and Alan Turing. In his seminal paper “On computable numbers,
with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem”, Turing introduced the construc-
tion of a universal computing machine, called a Turing Machine, with which he used to
formalize the notion of computability. Church, in his papers “An unsolvable problem
of elementary number theory” and “A note on the Entscheidungsproblem”, invented
a the λ-calculus and studied the notion of computable functions via this system. It is
6a consequence of the celebrated Church-Turing thesis that these two approaches are
in fact equivalent.
2.1.1 Untyped Lambda Calculus
Central to the aesthetic appeal of lambda calculus is its simplicity and elegance. The
syntax of lambda calculus consists of just three sorts: variables, function abstraction,
and application.
Formally, the set of all λ-terms, denoted Λ, is built up from a countably infinite
set of variables V = {v1, v2, . . .} using application and function abstraction. We define
Λ inductively as follows.
x ∈ V ⇒ x ∈ Λ
M,N ∈ Λ ⇒ (MN) ∈ Λ
M ∈ Λ, x ∈ V ⇒ λx.M ∈ Λ
The convention we adopt is for x, y, z, . . . to denote variables in V and forM,N,L, . . .
to denote arbitrary λ-terms.
For a λ-term M , the set of free variables of M , denoted FV (M), is defined
inductively as follows
FV (x) = {x}
FV (MN) = FV (M) ∪ FV (N)
FV (λx.M) = FV (M)− {x}
If x ∈ FV (M), we say that x is free in M . A variable in M that is not in FV (M) is
bound in M . M is called a closed λ-term, or combinator if FV (M) = ∅. The set of
closed λ-terms is denoted by Λ0.
7The result of substituting N for all free occurrences x inM , denotedM [x 7→ N ],
is defined inductively as follows.
x[x 7→ N ] ≡ N
y[x 7→ N ] ≡ y if x 6= y
(M1M2)[x 7→ N ] ≡ (M1[x 7→ N ])(M2[x 7→ N ])
(λy.M1)[x 7→ N ] ≡ λy(M1[x 7→ N ])
We would like to develop a formal notion of equivalence between λ-terms.
Equivalence in the theory of λ-calculus is given by three axiom schemes. First, α-
conversion rule formalizes the notion that renaming bound variables yield the same
λ-term. For example, we would naturally want λx.x and λy.y to be considered the
same term. Therefore, we have
α-equivalence: λx.M =α λy.M [x 7→ y], provided y does not occur in M .
Next, the β-reduction rule expresses the idea of function application. This is the
principle axiom scheme of the theory of λ-calculus.
β-reduction: (λx.M)N →β M [x 7→ N ]
Last, the η-conversion rule expresses the notion of extensionality. That is, two func-
tions are considered the same if they agree on all input arguments.
η-conversion: λx.(Mx)→η M , provided x /∈ FV (M).
2.1.2 Typed Lambda Calculus
Thus far, we have considered what is known as type-free λ-calculus, where every ex-
pression can be applied to every other expression, the former considered as a function
and the latter, an argument. For example, the identity function λx.x may be applied
to any λ-term to yield the term itself; in particular, λx.x may be applied to itself as
follows
(λx.x)(λx.x)→β λx.x
For an even more interesting example, consider the following λ-term
(λx. x x)(λx. x x)
8It is easy to see the above λ-term β-reduces to itself. Hence, we have the infinite
chain of reductions
(λx. x x)(λx. x x)→β (λx. x x)(λx. x x)→β . . .
It is left to the reader to consider the result of applying the λ-term (λx. x (xx)) to
itself.
While undoubtedly an expressive and elegant system, we are often times in-
terested in several properties that untyped λ-calculus does not possess. For example,
we might want all terms to have a normal form. That is,
for all terms N , there exists a term Nˆ such that N →∗β Nˆ and Nˆ does not
β-reduce to any other term.
Systems possessing such a property are called normalizing. It is easy to see from the
examples above that untyped λ-calculus is certainly not normalizing. In particular,
(λx.(xx))(λx.(xx)) does not have a normal form. For this reason and many others,
we are keenly interested in typed versions of λ-calculus. We first consider the most
basic, and in many ways canonical, form of typed λ-calculus known as simply typed
lambda calculus. The only form of connective in simply typed lambda calculus is
the function type →. This system, denoted by λ→, was developed independently by
Curry in 1934 and Church in 1940.
We will introduce the notion of a typing relation R that associates with each
λ-term in Λ its type. If M is a λ-term and a type σ is assigned to M , we say that ‘M
has type σ’ and also that ‘σ is inhabited by M.’ This judgment is typically denoted
M : σ
We will inductively defined the set of types T of λ→. First, we have the collec-
tion B of type constants for basic types such as Nat, the type of natural numbers,
and Bool, the type of booleans. We also have a denumerable set of type variables
V = {α, α′, α′′, . . .}. Instead of the somewhat cumbersome way of indexing α with
apostrophes to differentiate between type variables, we often use lower-case Greek
alphabets α, β, γ, . . . to denote arbitrary distinct types. T is then defined inductively
as follows.
9α ∈ V ⇒ α ∈ T
B ∈ B ⇒ B ∈ T
σ, τ ∈ T ⇒ (σ → τ) ∈ T
We often adopt the following more concise syntax, easily seen to be equivalent to the
inductive definition above.
T = V | B | T → T
V = α | V
Finally, a context is a set of typing assumptions from which new type assign-
ments can be derived. Contexts are typically denoted by Γ and often also ∆. If the
type assignment M : σ is derived from the context Γ, we say that ‘M : σ is derivable
from Γ’ and denote this judgment as
Γ ⊢M : σ
IfM : σ is derived from an empty set of assumptions, we write ⊢M : σ as a shorthand
for ∅ ⊢M : σ.
We may now define the typing relation R ⊂ Λ×T of λ→ by giving the axioms
and inference rules for type derivations in this system. Notice that they correspond
exactly to the three production rules in our inductive definition of Λ.
x : σ ∈ Γ var
Γ ⊢ x : σ
Γ ∪ {x : σ} ⊢M : τ
abs
Γ ⊢ λx : σ. M : σ → τ
Γ ⊢M : σ → τ Γ ⊢ N : σ app
Γ ⊢M N : τ
For example, we have
⊢ λx : α. x : α→ α
⊢ λx : α. λy : β. x : α→ (β → α)
10
⊢ λx : α→ β → γ. λy : α→ β. λz : α. x z (y z) : (α→ β → γ)→ (α→ β)→ α→ γ
We note that the λ-term (λx. xx) is untypable in λ→. That is, ((λx. x x), α) /∈
R for all α ∈ T . In fact λ→ is strongly normalizing, and consequently, βη-equivalence
is decidable. Here we state without proof six important properties of λ→.
Uniqueness of Types
If Γ ⊢M : σ and Γ ⊢M : τ , then σ = τ .
Subject Reduction
If Γ ⊢M : σ and M →βη N , then Γ ⊢ N : σ.
Strong Normalization
If Γ ⊢M : σ, then all βη-reductions from M terminate.
Substitution Property
If Γ ∪∆ ∪ {x : τ} ⊢M : σ and Γ ⊢ N : τ , then Γ ∪∆ ⊢M [x→ N ] : σ.
Weakening
If Γ ⊢M : σ and Γ ⊂ ∆, then ∆ ⊢M : σ.
Strengthening
If Γ ∪ {x : τ} ⊢M : σ and x /∈ FV (M), then Γ ⊢M : σ.
Given any type system, several natural questions may be asked. In particular, we
would like algorithms for the following problems.
1. Given a context Γ, a term M and a type σ, is it true that Γ ⊢M : σ?
2. Given a context Γ and a termM , does there exist a type σ such that Γ ⊢M : σ?
3. Given a type σ, does there exist a term M such that ⊢M : σ?
The above problems are known as the Type Checking, Type Synthesis and Type In-
habitation problems respectively. They are typically denoted as
Γ ⊢M : σ? Type Checking Problem (TCP)
Γ ⊢M :? Type Synthesis Problem (TSP)
Γ ⊢? : σ Type Inhabitation Problem (TIP)
We note that TCP, TSP and TIP are all decidable for λ→, and TSP is in fact equiva-
lent to TCP. We note also that TIP is typically undecidable even in the most modest
extensions of λ→. For example, TIP is undecidable in Girard and Reynold’s poly-
morphic lambda calculus System F.
11
Chapter 3
The Calculus of Inductive
Constructions and Coq
3.1 Calculus of Constructions
The Calculus of Constructions (CoC) [7] is a higher-order typed lambda-calculus,
developed jointly by Thierry Coquand and Gerard Huet in 1986. The CoC is intended
as a higher-order formalism for constructive proofs in natural deduction style. In
the spirit of the Curry-Howard correspondence as advocated by Martin-Lo¨f Type
Theory, every proof is a λ-expression in the Calculus of Constructions, typed with
propositions of the underlying logic. In fact, CoC can be seen as an extension of the
the Curry-Howard correspondence. The Curry-Howard correspondence establishes an
isomorphism between terms in simply typed lambda calculus with natural-deduction
style proofs in intuitionistic propositional logic; CoC extends this isomorphism to
proofs in full intuitionistic predicate calculus.
3.2 The Interactive Proof Assistant Coq
Coq is an interactive proof assistant for the development of formal machine-checked
proofs [5, 6, 14]. Developed as part of the LogiCal Project based in INRIA in France,
it is written in the Objective Caml programming language. The Calculus of Inductive
Constructions, an extention of CoC with inductive datatypes, is underlying theory
that the Coq proof assistant works within.
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Coq has made outstanding contributions to two broad fields within just two
decades of its inception. First, Coq has been used extensively and effectively by
mathematicians, logicians and computer scientists alike to produce formal proofs of
mathematical theorems. Theorems that have been successfully formalized in Coq
range from the simple and straightforward, such as the irrationality of
√
2, to the
deep and profound, such as the Four Color Theorem, Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theo-
rem, and the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra. Beyond its contributions to the field
of formalized mathematics, Coq has also been of great interest to software engineers
interested in applying formal methods to the development of provably correct code
and zero-fault software. To this end, Coq is used to first formally state software
specifications, and then prove that corresponding code does indeed meet the desired
specifications. Admittedly, it can be argued that these two fields are in fact unified –
or rather, the second can be seen to be subsumed by the first – by the Curry-Howard
correspondence.
Our work falls into the former category. It should be noted, though, that our
project differs significantly in spirit to almost all previous work in the area. Most
projects have been concerned with the formalization of mathematical theorems in
Coq. Just as in mainstream mathematical practice, such formalizations implicitly
assume an underlying logic and axiomatic system and work within the logical system.
In this thesis, however, we are interested not in producing formal proofs of theorems,
but instead in verifying the correctness of a particular logical system – our work is thus
driven by foundational interests. In particular, our goal is to formalize the syntactic
and logical meta-theory of Q0, and to produce formal proofs of meta-theorems such as
alpha-equivalence, beta-reduction and the deduction theorem. To draw an analogy,
we are interested in proving properties about a programming language, instead of
the correctness of code written in a programming language. In fact, the spirit of our
project is very much akin to work done in Twelf [11, 12], an implementation of the
logical framework LF is used extensively for the verification of programming language
meta-theory.
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Chapter 4
Q0 in Coq
Science is what we understand well enough to explain to a computer,
Art is all the rest.
Don Knuth
4.1 Peter Andrew’s Classical Higher Order Logic
Q0
Introduced by Peter Andrews in the 1960’s [2, 3], Q0 is a classical higher-order logic
based on simply-typed lambda calculus. There are several reasons why we are inter-
ested in formalizing the meta-theory of Q0.
• A formal proof of Q0’s correctness would be of significant foundational interest.
Peter Andrews uses Q0 as a formal framework to develop core areas of the foun-
dations of mathematics, including cardinals and the axiom of infinity, Peano’s
postulates, primitive recursive functions, etc.
• Q0 is an elegant logical system with significant aesthetic appeal. It is a minimal
logic based only on equality, with all its theory built on just 5 axiom schema
and 1 inference rule.
• The complex syntax of Q0 makes it impossible for its correctness to be checked
by hand. Consider, for example, the following definition of the ∧ operator
[λxoλyo  [λgooo  goooTT ] = [λgooo  goooxoyo]]
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Peculiar syntactic conventions such as linear replacement allowing for variable
capture pose additional challenges.
• Issues such as variable binding and replacement which we have to deal with
explicitly are of contemporary interest in the programming language theory
community. In particular, this is one of the central concerns of researchers
working in mechanized meta-theory of programming languages.
4.2 A Central Challenge: Formalizing the Syntac-
tic Meta-Theory
In studying Peter Andrews’ formalism of Q0, one notices that all logical derivations
are made very explicit and carried out meticulously. In fact, one is immediately im-
pressed by how such a high level of detail and accuracy is attained without the aid
of the multitude of theorem provers and proof assistants available for our use today.
However, although logical derivations are made explicit, Andrews chooses to
keep most syntactic derivations implicit in the meta-proofs of Q0. This poses a
challenge for our work on producing machine-checked proofs of the meta-theorems.
Consider the following example of a syntactic derivation kept implicit in Andrews’
formalism:
If A′ is the result of replacing all free occurrences of x by y in a well-
formed formula A, and if x does not occur free in A, then we have that
A′ is the same as A.
Such syntactic lemmas are arguably intuitive and straightforward and therefore are
understandably kept implicit even a formalism as thorough and meticulous as An-
drews’. However, in a completely formal development such as ours all derivations, be
they logical or syntactic, have to be made explicit to the theorem prover. Considering
again the above example, we see that even the statement of such a straightforward
lemma in a theorem prover entails the encoding and formalizing of syntactic notions
such as variable occurrence, variable binding, and the equivalence of terms. Q0’s
complex syntactic notions pose additional challenges. Typically, substitutions al-
lowed by replacement rules of logical systems are non-linear, meaning all occurrences
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are replaced, and variable capture avoiding. Substitution in Q0, however, allows for
variable capture in certain cases, and only replaces a single occurrence.
4.2.1 Previous work: The Sublogic in RSP
We briefly mention as an aside how the syntactic meta-theory of Q0 is encoded in
our formalism in Rogue-Sigma-Pi (RSP) [13]. The approach we chose to take there
was to encode an underlying logical system — what we called a sublogic — within
our logical framework RSP. With the added expressiveness of this sublogic in our
logical framework, we then formalize various syntactic relations among Q0 terms and
variables, which allow us to build proofs of meta-theoretic properties resulting from
these relations. The proofs of these syntactic lemmas are used to provide explicit
syntactic derivations in the meta-proofs of Q0’s meta-theorems.
Our sublogic in RSP is a multi-sorted classical first-order natural deduction
system. The primitive sorts of our sublogic are Q0 types, variables, constants, terms,
as well as positions in terms and variable numbers. The sublogic permits quantifica-
tion over all primitive sorts. Also, we take a small set of basic syntactic notions as
primitive. Every derived syntactic notion is then defined by a first-order formula of
our sublogic, and carrying out syntactic derivations corresponds to building proofs in
our natural deduction system.
sl_o :: type. # sublogic formula
sl_pf :: sl_o => type. # sublogic proof
Therefore, a sublogic formula A is true if and only if the type sl pf A is inhabited.
Our development of the syntactic meta-theory of Coq is very similar to the approach
mentioned here, except that we adopt the primitive intuitionistic logic of the Calculus
of Constructions as our sublogic.
4.3 The Primitive Basis of Q0
4.3.1 Q0 types, constants and terms
In this section, we will discuss the embedding of the primitive basis of Q0 in the
Calculus of Inductive Constructions. A presentation of Q0 types, variables, constants
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and terms will run parallel with a discussion of their corresponding representations
in the interactive theorem prover Coq.
The types of Q0 are defined recursively as shown below.
types t ::= ı type of individuals
| o type of truth values
| (αβ) type of functions from elements
of type β to elements of type α
We bring to the reader’s attention a peculiarity in the definition given above. One
might find it counter-intuitive that the type of functions from elements of type β to
elements of type α is denoted by (αβ) instead of the seemingly more natural (βα).
The motivation behind this choice of notation does become apparent when one con-
siders the function application of a term of type (βα), denoted Aαβ, to an argument.
First, note that our typing rules dictate that the argument to Aαβ necessarily has
type β and hence we denote it as Bβ. Now, we see that the function application
denoted by AαβBβ in fact explicitly underscores the agreement of types, and we see
how this is in some sense a better notation than AβαBβ.
We now give the definition of Q0 types as encoded in our formalism in Coq.
We note the impressively close correspondence between the inductive mathematical
definition presented in Andrews’ formalism on paper, and the inductive definition
entered into a theorem prover as shown below.
1. Inductive q0_type : Set :=
2. I : q0_type
3. | O : q0_type
4. | Fun : q0_type -> q0_type -> q0_type.
The Coq keywords Inductive and Set in Line 1 denote the start of an inductively
defined set of objects. Lines 2 and 3 correspond to the base cases of the inductive
definition; they encode 0-arity constructors I and O that construct objects represent-
ing the type of individuals and truth values respectively. Lastly, Line 4 defines the
constructor for types of functions. The type of a function is indexed by two other
types, the type of its domain and the type of its range; correspondingly, Fun takes in
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two terms of type q0 type and returns a term of type q0 type.
With the exception of the abstraction operator λ and parentheses [ ], the only
primitive symbols of Q0 are variables and logical constants. For every type symbol
α, we have a countably infinite set of variables of type α:
vα, v
′
α, v
′′
α, v
′′′
α , v
′′′′
α , . . .
Accordingly, Q0 variables in Coq are indexed not only by their types, but also by a
natural number.
Inductive Var : q0_type -> Set :=
V_ : forall t, nat -> Var t.
Therefore, V is a constructor that takes in a type t and a natural number n and
returns the nth variable of type t. For example, (V O 1) gives us the first variable
of type O, and (V (Fun O I) 5) gives us the fifth variable of type (Fun O I).
For every type α, we have a corresponding logical constant Q((oα)α) denoting the
identity relation between elements of type α. Also, there is the description operator
(also known as a selection operator) ι(ı(oı)). First, we note that the semantics assigned
to these logical constants do in fact correspond to the intuition given to us by their
types. Q((oα)α) is the curried version of a function that takes in two terms of type
α and returns a truth value (we remind our readers once again that the types of
functions should be read from right to left.) In other words, for terms Aα and Bα of
type α, (Q(oα)α)Aα)Bα is a term of type o, the type of truth values. The description
operator ι(ı(oı)) takes in a function from individuals to truth values, and returns an
individual. One may therefore view ι(ı(oı)) as a function mapping subsets of the set of
all individuals to individuals — hence its name the selection operator. The encoding
of Q((oα)α) and ι(ı(oı)) in Coq is shown below.
Inductive Const : q0_type -> Set :=
Q_ : forall t, Const (Fun (Fun O t) t)
| Iota_ : Const (Fun I (Fun O I)).
Notice that the constant Q((oα)α) is indexed by a type symbol α. Correspondingly, our
constructor Q is universally quantified over the set of all objects of type q0 type; for
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example, the term (Q (Fun I O)) is the identity relation between elements of type
(ιo) and its own type is (o(ιo))(ιo).
In Q0, well-formed formulas, also known as terms, are indexed by their corre-
sponding types. We shall adopt Andrews’ convention of denoting well-formed formu-
las with uppercase letters subscripted by their types — for example, Aα, Bβ and Cαβ
represent well-formed formulas of types α, β and (αβ) respectively. Further, we abbre-
viate the collection of all well-formed formulas of type α by wffα. The type symbol o is
usually elided, and we will use A, B, C as syntactic variables for well-formed formu-
las of type o. The recursive definition of well-formed formulas is then given as follows.
1. A primitive variable or constant of type α is a wffα.
2. AαβBβ is a wffα denoting the application of the function Aαβ to Bβ.
3. λxβAα is a wff(αβ) denoting a lambda abstraction.
Again, we note that our encoding of the logical constants of Q0 in Coq is virtually
isomorphic to the mathematical definition given above.
Inductive Trm : q0_type -> Set :=
_v : forall t, Var t -> Trm t
| _c : forall t, Const t -> Trm t
| Lambda : forall s t, Var s -> Trm t -> Trm (Fun t s)
| Apply : forall s t, Trm (Fun s t) -> Trm t -> Trm s.
The constructors v and c allow us to cast variables and constants as terms. For
example, the following are the terms (with type Trm) corresponding to the two logical
constants of Q0.
Definition Iota := _c Iota_.
Definition Q := fun (t : q0_type) => _c (Q_ t).
Similarly, v (V O 3) and v (V (Fun O I) 15) have type Trm in our formalism.
Check ( v (V O 3)).
v (V O 3) : Trm O
Check ( v (V (Fun O I) 15)).
v (V (Fun O I) 15) : Trm (Fun O I).
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4.3.2 Definitions of Logical Operators in Q0
As mentioned in the previous section, the only primitive non-trivial symbols of Q0
are variables and the logical constants Q((oα)α) and ι(ı(oı)). All other logical operators,
such as ∧, ∨, ⊃, and ∼ are defined in terms of primitive symbols. We list here all
abbreviations and definitions of logical operators in Q0. The square dot  represents a
left bracket, where the corresponding right bracket is as far right as possible without
violating any other pairings already present.
[Aα = Bα] stands for [QoααAαBα]
[A ≡ B] stands for [QoooAB]
To stands for [Qooo = Qooo]
Fo stands for [λxoT ] = [λxoxo]
Πo(αα) stands for [Qo(oα)(oα)[λxαT ]]
[∀xαA] stands for [Πo(oα)[λxαA]]
∧ooo stands for [λxoλyo  [λgooo  goooTT ] = [λgooo  goooxoyo]]
[A ∧B] stands for [∧oooAB]
⊃ooo stands for [λxoλyo  xo = xo ∧ yo]
[A ⊃ B] stands for [⊃ooo AB]
∼oo stands for [QoooF ]
∨ooo stands for [λxoλyo  ∼  [∼ xo] ∧ [∼ yo]]
[A ∨B] stands for [∨oooAB]
[∃xαA] stands for [∼ ∀xα ∼ A]
[Aα 6= Bα] stands for [∼ Aα = Aα]
The above abbreviations and definitions have all be formalized in Coq. Due to space
considerations, we will only give the first few encodings here.
Definition Equals (t : q0_type)
:= fun (A:Trm t)(B:Trm t) => Apply (Apply (Q t) A) B.
Definition Equiv
:= fun (A B:Trm O) => Apply (Apply (Q O) A) B.
Definition True := Equals (Q O) (Q O).
Definition False
:= Equals (Lambda (V O) True) (Lambda (V O) (_v (V O))).
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Definition Pi (t : q0_type)
:= Apply (Q (Fun O t)) (Lambda (V t) True).
Definition Forall (t : q0_type)
:= fun (x : Var t)(A:Trm O) => Apply (Pi t) (Lambda x A).
4.3.3 Axioms and Inference Rules
Q0 has five axioms, three of which (2α, 3αβ and 41 − 45) are axiom schemata.
Axioms for Q0
(1) gooTo ∧ gooFo = ∀xo  gooxo
(2α) [xα = yα] ⊃  hoαxα = hoαyα
(3αβ) fαβ = gαβ = ∀xβ  fαβxβ = gαβxβ
(41) [λxαBβ]Aα = Bβ where Bβ is a primitive constant or variable distinct
from xα
(42) [λxαxα]Aα = Aα
(43) [λxα  BβγCγ ]Aα = [[λxαBβγ]Aα][[λxαCγ]Aα]
(44) [λxα  λyγBδ]Aα = [λyγ  [λxαBδ]Aα] where yγ is distinct from xα and
from all variables in Aα
(45) [λxα  λxαBδ]Aα = [λxαBδ]
(5) ιι(oι)[Qoιιyι] = yι
Axiom 1 states that we are working in a bimodal logic. That is, Truth and Falsehood
are the only truth values in our logical system, or equivalently, To and Fo are the only
well-formed formulas of type o. Axiom Schemata 2 and 41−45 give us basic properties
about equality and λ, respectively. Axiom Schema 3αβ states the Q0 equivalent of
the Axiom of Extensionality, while Axiom 5 gives us the Q0 equivalent of the Axiom
of Descriptions.
After instantiating the variables goo, xo and meta-variables xα, yα, hoα, fαβ, gαβ,
Axioms 1, 2α and 3αβ are dealt with routinely.
Axiom axiom_1 :
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Pf (Equals (And (Apply (_v g_oo) True) (Apply (_v g_oo) False))
(Forall O x_o (Apply (_v g_oo) (_v x_o)))).
Axiom axiom_2a : forall (a : q0_type),
Pf (Implies (Equals (_v (x_a a)) (_v (y_a a)))
(Equals (Apply (_v (h_oa a)) (_v (x_a a)))
(Apply (_v (h_oa a)) (_v (y_a a))))).
Axiom axiom_3ab : forall (a b : q0_type),
Pf (Equals (Equals (_v (f_ab a b)) (_v (g_ab a b)))
(Forall _ (x_a b)
(Equals (Apply (_v (f_ab a b)) (_v (x_a b)))
(Apply (_v (g_ab a b)) (_v (x_a b)))))).
Axiom Schema 41, however, is not as straightforward. In order to state the restric-
tion that Bβ is a primitive constant or variable distinct from xα, we need a notion
of equality between variables. Fortunately, this simple enough. Variables in Q0 are
indexed by a type and a natural number; hence, two variables are considered equiv-
alent if and only if they are of the same type and are indexed by the same number.
Now equality of variables is reduced to equality of types and natural numbers.
Inductive eqvar : forall a b, Var a -> Var b -> Prop :=
eqvar_ax : forall a b n1 n2,
a = b ->
n1 = n2 ->
eqvar a b (V_ a n1) (V_ b n2)).
Two variables are considered different simply when they are not equal.
Definition diffvar (a b: q0_type)(A : Var a)(B : Var b)
:= ~(eqvar A B).
With this, we may now state Axiom Schema 41. We split 41 up into 41v and 41c,
mirroring the case split on whether Bα is a variable or a constant.
Axiom axiom_41v :
forall (a b : q0_type), forall (x : Var a),
forall (A : Trm a), forall (v: Var b),
diffvar x v ->
Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x (_v v)) A) (_v v))).
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Axiom axiom_41c :
forall (a b : q0_type), forall (x : Var a),
forall (A : Trm a), forall (c : Const b),
Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x (_c c)) A) (_c c)).
The statement of 44 poses yet another challenge.
(44) [λxα  λyγBδ]Aα = [λyγ  [λxαBδ]Aα] where yγ is distinct from xα
and from all variables in Aα
Equivalent to formalizing the notion that yγ is distinct from all variables in Aα is
being able to state the following property of Aα
forall t, forall v : Var t, occurs ( v v) A => diffvar v y
We will set this aside and press ahead for now, noting that this is the first indica-
tion that an encoding of the syntactic meta-theory of Q0 is necessary before we can
proceed. By presenting more examples of the same flavor, we hope to make the case
that these syntactical issues can no longer be dealt with in an online fashion , but
instead, we need to develop and formalize a complete syntactic meta-theory.
Q0’s single rule of inference is a rule of replacement which allows for variable
capture. We remind our readers that A,B,C etc. are abbreviations for the wffos Ao,
Bo, Co etc.
Rule R FromC andAα = Bα to infer the result of replacing one occurrence
of Aα in C by an occurrence of Bα, provided that the occurrence of Aα
in C is not immediately preceded by λ.
We immediately see that the statement of Rule R poses several challenges. There are
three non-trivial syntactic notions, all of which have to be first explicitly dealt with
in our formalism before we can even state the rule.
1. Aα is a subterm of C at position p.
2. Replacing Aα by Bα in C at position p gives us D.
3. The occurrence of Aα in C is not immediately preceded by λ. Equivalently, if
Aα is a subterm of C at position p, then p is not a binding position in C.
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We note that the statement of Rule R is in fact trivial after we have formalized these
three syntactic judgments – this should not come as a surprise as the notion of linear
replacement as captured by Rule R is a purely syntactic one.
Axiom Rule_R :
forall a : q0_type, forall A B : Trm a,
forall p : Pos, forall C D : Trm O,
Pf C ->
Pf (Equals A B) ->
replace A B p C D ->
~ pos_binding p C ->
Pf D.
For a more elaborate example, consider the following generalization of Rule R.
Rule R’ From H ⊢ Aα = Bα and H ⊢ C to infer the result of replacing one
occurrence of Aα in C by an occurrence of Bα, provided the occurrence
of Aα in C is not immediately preceded by λ and the occurrence of Aα
in C is not in a wf part [λxβEγ] of C, where xβ is free in a member of
H and free in [Aα = Bα]
We hope it is now clear that in order for our development of Q0 in Coq to proceed, a
formalization ofQ0’s syntactic meta-theory is necessitated. In fact, since the syntactic
details of Q0 were implicitly assumed in Peter Andrews’ presentation, we have to first
develop the snytactic meta-theory on paper, before formalizing it in Coq. In this way,
we will be able to provide formal proofs of syntactic judgments (including but not
limited to those mentioned above), which are then combined with logical derivations
to provide completely formal proofs of Q0’s meta-theorems.
4.4 The Syntactic Meta-Theory
In our syntactic meta-theory, we take several elementary notions as primitive: type-
equivalence, variable-equivalence, constant-equivalence, term-equivalence, and position-
equivalence, the subterm relationship and the prefix relationship between two posi-
tions. All other syntactic notions are derived from these basic primitive notions.
Our approach is built on the following ideal: All primitive notions should be simple
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enough that their correctness can be checked easily. Any notions entailing non-trivial
definitions (variable binding, for example) are derived from primitive notions.
We will walk through an example of defining and formalizing a primitive syn-
tactic notion. The subterm relationship is defined by a ternary judgment – A is
a subterm of B at position p, which we will denote as A ≺p B. First, we state
(informally, on paper) the axioms and inference rules corresponding to the subterm
judgment. We will let ǫ denote the empty position and 0 · p and 1 · p denote the
position we get by prefixing p by 0 and 1 (left and right) respectively.
subtrm-empty
A ≺ǫ A
T ≺p M
subtrm-apply0
T ≺0·p M N
T ≺p N
subtrm-apply1
T ≺1·p M N
T ≺p x
subtrm-lambda0
T ≺0·p λx.M
T ≺p N
subtrm-lambda1
T ≺1·p λx.M
Each rule then corresponds to a case in our inductive definition of subtrm – axioms
correspond to base cases, and inference rules correspond to inductive constructors.
Inductive subtrm : forall a b, Trm a -> Trm b -> Pos -> Prop :=
subtrm_empty : forall a A, subtrm a a A A empty
| subtrm_apply0 : forall a b t M N T p,
subtrm t (Fun a b) T M p ->
subtrm _ _ T (Apply M N) (P0 p)
| subtrm_apply1 : forall a b t M N T p,
subtrm t b T N p ->
subtrm _ a T (Apply M N) (P1 p)
| subtrm_lambda0 : forall a b t x M T p,
subtrm t a T (_v x) p ->
subtrm t (Fun b a) T (Lambda x M) (P0 p)
| subtrm_lambda1 : forall a b t x M T p,
subtrm t b T M p ->
25
subtrm t (Fun b a) T (Lambda x M) (P1 p).
Naturally, building proofs of such syntactic judgments can be tedious and burden-
some. For instance, consider the following.
Qooo ≺011111001 [λxoλyo  [λgooo  gooo[Qooo = Qooo][Qooo = Qooo]] = [λgooo  goooxoyo]]
A proof of the above judgment, if it exists, should be easy to find mechanically. In fact,
Coq has language support for meta-level tactics that automate the building of such
proofs of judgments. We are able to guarantee total correctness of our tactics. That
is, the tactics we write all have the following soundness and completeness guarantees.
Soundness Every proof a tactic builds is valid.
Completeness If a proof exists, the tactics are guaranteed to find it.
We write a corresponding tactic for each judgment in our syntactic meta-theory. For
example, the tactic for subterm takes in arbitrary types α and β, terms Aα and Bβ, a
position p, and builds a proof of Aα ≺p Bβ if one exists. As our syntactic notions get
more complex and intricate, we have tacticals that call tactics as subroutines. Tactics
and tacticals therefore help relief the burden of having to build lengthy proofs by hand.
Having encoded a full syntactic meta-theory of Q0 in our formalism in Coq,
we are now able to state many syntactic notions integral to the development of the
theory of Q0. For example, let us consider again Rule R’, the generalization of Rule
R.
Rule R’ From H ⊢ Aα = Bα and H ⊢ C to infer the result of replacing
one occurrence of Aα in C by an occurrence of Bα, provided the
occurrence of Aα in C is not immediately preceded by λ and the
occurrence of Aα in C is not in a wf part [λxβEγ] of C, where xβ is
free in a member of H and free in [Aα = Bα]
Rule R’ can now be formally stated in Coq as follows.
1. Axiom Rule_R’ :
2. forall H, forall a, forall A B : Trm a, forall C D p,
3. HypPf H (Equals A B) ->
4. HypPf H C ->
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5. replace A B p C D ->
6. ~ pos_binding p C ->
7. forall p’: Pos, forall x, forall E,
8. (subtrm (Lambda x E) C p’) /\ (occurs A E) ->
9. (forall h, member h H -> ~ free_in x h)
10. \/ ~ (free_in x (Equals A B)))) ->
11. HypPf H D.
Lines 5-10 correspond to syntactic properties of our input. We have a tactical for the
Rule R’ that calls tactics corresponding are called for each of these syntactic proper-
ties. If proofs are successfully found and built for all of them, we are then allowed to
infer as a result of Rule R’ the linear replacement of one occurrence of Aα in H ⊢ C
by Bα.
We briefly mention here an interesting challenge that arises in the formalization
ofQ0’s syntactic meta-theory. In the process of proving various syntactic properties of
Q0, we have on several occasions needed the following seemingly intuitive fact about
dependent types: If two dependent types are equal, then their corresponding indexing
terms have to be equal too. In the language of Coq, such an injectivity property can
be stated as follows.
Lemma projS2_eq :
forall (A : Set)(P : A -> Set)(x : A) (p1 p2 : P x),
existS P x p1 = existS P x p2 -> p1 = p2.
where existS is a construct for building nested subset types
Inductive sigS (A : Set) (P : A -> Set) : Set :=
existS : forall x : A, P x -> sigS A P.
Implicit Arguments sigS [A].
Somewhat surprisingly, Lemma projS2 eq above is in fact independent of Coq’s type
theory, the reason being that it is equivalent to Streicher’s K axiom. Hence, we have
had to include this injectivity property as an axiom in our formalism.
4.5 The Meta-Theorems of Q0
Having developed and formalized the syntactic meta-theory of Q0, we have since
proceeded to encoding formal proofs of Q0’s meta-theorems in Coq. Examples of
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meta-theorems proved in our formalism include reflexivity of equality, basic equality
rules, general and restricted versions of substitution in Q0 (such as β-reduction) as
well as η-conversion. Many of these meta-theorems rely heavily on the inductive
reasoning power of Coq and the Calculus of Inductive Constructions. For example,
consider the following statement of a form of β-reduction in Q0. Theorem 5203 states
that
⊢ [λxαBβ]Aα = SxαAαBβ provided no variable in Aα is bound in Bβ
where Sxα
Aα
Bβ denotes the result of substituting free occurrences of xα by Aα in Bβ.
The proof of this theorem is done by induction on the form of Bβ, or equivalently,
the number of occurrences of [ in Bβ.
Having completed this phase of the project, proving the meta-theorems of Q0
has become the main emphasis of our work. However, as new syntactic notions arise
in the statement and proofs of Q0’s meta-theorems, we certainly expect that the
syntactic meta-theory we have developed will be revisited frequently and perhaps
supplemented from time to time. It is our hope that our work will culminate in the
proving of the Deduction Theorem of Q0.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Informal proofs mathematicians write are susceptible to logical errors – routine logical
steps are left out, and a great amount of context is assumed on the part of the reader.
Traditionally, the correctness of a proof has been verified by peer review, where the
reviewer fills in some of the logical gaps herself and skips over the others. This process
cannot provide us with absolute guarantees of the total correctness proofs. In light
of this, there has been significant interest in producing formal proofs of mathemat-
ical theorems. Formal proofs are proofs in which every intermediate logical step is
supplied, and no appeal is made to intuition. Naturally, such proofs can become over
symbolic and syntactic, and hence burdensome to build by hand. Fortunately, the
advent of automated theorem provers and interactive proof assistants have made the
building of formal proofs a tractable endeavor. In fact, advances in such technology
have gone a long way in making the process akin to writing an informal proof on
paper. Drawing on ideas from Type Theory, Computational Logic and the theory of
Automated Deduction, these theorem provers and proof assistants are able to guar-
antee the total correctness of our proofs.
In this thesis, we have discussed our contributions to the formalization of math-
ematics. We discussed our effort to formalize the meta-theory of Peter Andrews’ clas-
sical higher-order logic Q0 based on typed lambda calculus. There are several reasons
why a formal proof of Q0’s correctness is of significant interest and importance. First,
Q0 is the formal framework within which Peter Andrews develops cores areas in the
foundations of mathematics, including cardinals and the axiom of infinity, Peano’s
postulates and primitive recursive functions. Second, Q0 is an elegant logical system
with significant aesthetic appeal – it is a minimal logic based only on equality, with
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all its meta-theory built on just 5 axioms and 1 inference rule. Third, the complex
syntax of Q0 makes it impossible for us to check its meta-theorems by hand. Such
challenges lend themselves very naturally to the use of interactive proof assistants and
automated theorem provers. Last, issues such as variable binding and replacement
which we have to deal with explicitly in our formalism are of contemporary interest
in the programming language community. In particular, this has become a primary
concern of researchers working in mechanized meta-theory of programming languages.
Our formalization is carried out in the interactive proof assistant Coq, based
on the Calculus of Inductive Construction. The Calculus of Inductive Construction
is an extension of Coquand and Huet’s Calculus of Constructions with support for
inductive data types. Both systems are based on higher-order typed lambda calculus,
and are designed for the building of proofs in full intuitionistic predicate calculus. Coq
has been a major force in the formalization of mathematics; the full formal proofs of
the Four Color Theorem and Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem, among hundreds of
others, have both been encoded in Coq.
A central challenge that arose in the formalizing of Q0 was having to explicitly
encode and reason about its various syntactic notions. Although Peter Andrews
was impressively careful in his development of Q0’s logical meta-theory, providing all
logical derivations in great detail, the syntactic meta-theory was kept implicit in his
presentation. In a completely formal development such as ours, all derivations, logical
and syntactic, have to be made explicit; even just the statement of many of Q0’s
meta-theorems necessitate reasoning about complex syntactic notions. Therefore,
we first developed and encoded the syntactic meta-theory in our formalism in Coq.
Within this framework, we were then able to encode and reason about Q0’s syntactic
notions such as scope, variable binding, and replacement. This allowed us to explicitly
carry out syntactic derivations kept implicit in Andrews’ presentation and to provide
completely formal proofs of Q0’s meta-theorems. As far as we know, this thesis
presents the first effort to formalize Peter Andrews’ logical system Q0.
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Appendix
Attached in this appendix is the Coq source code for our formalization ofQ0. As this is
still very much work in progress, the most updated version may be obtained either on-
line at http://cl.cse.wustl.edu, or by contacting the author at lytan@wustl.edu.
The Core of Q0: Types, Variables, Constants and Terms
(* Q0 types *)
Inductive q0_type : Set :=
I : q0_type
| O : q0_type
| Fun : q0_type -> q0_type -> q0_type.
(* Q0 variables *)
Inductive Var : q0_type -> Set :=
V_ : forall t, nat -> Var t.
(* Q0 constants *)
Inductive Const : q0_type -> Set :=
Iota_ : Const (Fun I (Fun O I))
| Q_ : forall t, Const (Fun (Fun O t) t).
(* Q0 terms *)
Inductive Trm : q0_type -> Set :=
_v : forall t, Var t -> Trm t
| _c : forall t, Const t -> Trm t
| Lambda : forall s t, Var s -> Trm t -> Trm (Fun t s)
| Apply : forall s t, Trm (Fun s t) -> Trm t -> Trm s.
Implicit Arguments _v.
Implicit Arguments _c.
Implicit Arguments Lambda.
Implicit Arguments Apply.
Definition V := fun (t : q0_type) => V_ t 0.
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Definition Iota := _c Iota_.
Definition Q := fun (t : q0_type) => _c (Q_ t).
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Basic Syntactic Notions
(* Equality between types, variables, constants and terms *)
Inductive eqtp : q0_type -> q0_type -> Prop :=
eqtp_ax : forall a b : q0_type,
a = b ->
eqtp a b.
Definition difftp (a b : q0_type) := ~(eqtp a b).
Inductive eqvar : forall a b, Var a -> Var b -> Prop :=
eqvar_ax : forall a b n1 n2,
eqtp a b -> n1 = n2 ->
eqvar a b (V_ a n1) (V_ b n2).
Definition diffvar (a b: q0_type)(A : Var a)(B : Var b)
:= ~(eqvar A B).
Inductive eqtrm : forall a b, Trm a -> Trm b -> Prop :=
eqtrm_var : forall a b v1 v2,
eqvar v1 v2 ->
eqtrm a b (_v v1) (_v v2)
| eqtrm_const: forall a b, forall A : Const a, forall B : Const b,
eqtp a b ->
eqtrm a b (_c A) (_c B)
| eqtrm_apply: forall a b c d M1 N1 M2 N2,
eqtrm (Fun a b) (Fun c d) M1 M2 ->
eqtrm _ _ N1 N2 ->
eqtrm _ _ (Apply M1 N1) (Apply M2 N2)
| eqtrm_lambda :
forall a b c d,
forall x : Var a, forall y : Var c, forall M1 M2,
eqvar x y ->
eqtrm b d M1 M2 ->
eqtrm _ _ (Lambda x M1) (Lambda y M2).
Definition difftrm (a b : q0_type) (A : Trm a) (B : Trm b) :=
~(eqtrm A B).
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Implicit Arguments eqvar.
Implicit Arguments diffvar.
Implicit Arguments eqtrm.
Implicit Arguments difftrm.
Theorem eqtrm_imp_eqtp :
forall a b, forall A : Trm a, forall B : Trm b,
eqtrm A B -> eqtp a b.
Proof.
intros.
induction H.
elim H.
auto.
assumption.
inversion IHeqtrm1.
assumption.
elim H.
intros.
exact (eqtp_Fun _ _ _ _ IHeqtrm H1).
Qed.
(* Positions *)
Inductive Pos : Set :=
empty : Pos
| P0 : Pos -> Pos
| P1 : Pos -> Pos.
Inductive eqpos : Pos -> Pos -> Prop :=
eqpos_empty : eqpos empty empty
| eqpos_0 : forall p1 p2, eqpos p1 p2 -> eqpos (P0 p1) (P0 p2)
| eqpos_1 : forall p1 p2, eqpos p1 p2 -> eqpos (P1 p1) (P1 p2).
Definition diffpos (p1 p2 : Pos) := ~ eqpos p1 p2.
Inductive pos_left : Pos -> Pos -> Prop :=
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pos_left_empty : pos_left empty (P0 empty)
| pos_left_0 : forall p1 p2,
pos_left p1 p2 -> pos_left (P0 p1) (P0 p2)
| pos_left_1 : forall p1 p2,
pos_left p1 p2 -> pos_left (P1 p1) (P1 p2).
Inductive prefix : Pos -> Pos -> Prop :=
prefix_empty : forall p, prefix empty p
| prefix_0 : forall p1 p2, prefix p1 p2 -> prefix (P0 p1) (P0 p2)
| prefix_1 : forall p1 p2, prefix p1 p2 -> prefix (P1 p1) (P1 p2).
Definition disjoint (p1 p2 : Pos)
:= ~ (prefix p1 p2) /\ ~ (prefix p2 p1).
(* Subterm *)
Inductive subtrm : forall a b, Trm a -> Trm b -> Pos -> Prop :=
subtrm_empty : forall a A, subtrm a a A A empty
| subtrm_apply0 : forall a b t M N T p,
subtrm t (Fun a b) T M p ->
subtrm _ _ T (Apply M N) (P0 p)
| subtrm_apply1 : forall a b t M N T p,
subtrm t b T N p ->
subtrm _ a T (Apply M N) (P1 p)
| subtrm_lambda0 : forall a b t x M T p,
subtrm t a T (_v x) p ->
subtrm t (Fun b a) T (Lambda x M) (P0 p)
| subtrm_lambda1 : forall a b t x M T p,
subtrm t b T M p ->
subtrm t (Fun b a) T (Lambda x M) (P1 p).
Implicit Arguments subtrm.
Definition pos_binding (p : Pos)(a : q0_type)(A : Trm a) :=
exists p2, exists s, exists t,
exists x : Var s, exists M : Trm t,
(pos_left p2 p) /\ (subtrm (Lambda x M) A p2).
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Implicit Arguments pos_binding.
Definition occurs (a t : q0_type)(x : Var a)(T : Trm t) :=
exists p, subtrm (_v x) T p.
Implicit Arguments occurs.
Definition replace
(a t : q0_type)(A B : Trm a)(p : Pos)(T1 T2 : Trm t) :=
(subtrm A T1 p) /\ (subtrm B T2 p) /\ forall p’, (disjoint p p’ ->
forall q, forall Q : Trm q,
(subtrm Q T1 p’ <-> subtrm Q T2 p’)).
Implicit Arguments replace.
Definition bound (a b : q0_type)(x : Var a)(B: Trm b) :=
exists p, exists t, exists M : Trm t, (subtrm (Lambda x M) B p).
Implicit Arguments bound.
Definition free (a b : q0_type)(x : Var a)(B : Trm b) :=
occurs x B /\ ~ bound a b x B.
Implicit Arguments free.
Definition var_in (t a: q0_type) (x: Var t) (A: Trm a) :=
exists p, subtrm (_v x) A p.
Implicit Arguments var_in.
Definition var_in_ (t a: q0_type) (x: Var t) (A: Trm a) (p: Pos) :=
subtrm (_v x) A p.
Implicit Arguments var_in_.
Definition free_in (t a: q0_type) (x: Var t) (A: Trm a) :=
exists p, (var_in_ x A p /\
forall p’, forall t2: q0_type, forall M: Trm t2,
prefix p’ p -> ~ (subtrm (Lambda x M) A p’)).
Implicit Arguments free_in.
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Definition free_in_ (t a: q0_type) (x: Var t) (A: Trm a) (p: Pos) :=
(var_in_ x A p /\
forall p’, forall t2: q0_type, forall M: Trm t2,
prefix p’ p -> ~ (subtrm (Lambda x M) A p’)).
Implicit Arguments free_in_.
Definition bound_in (t a: q0_type) (x: Var t) (A: Trm a) :=
exists p, (var_in_ x A p /\
exists p’, exists t2:q0_type, exists M: Trm t2,
prefix p’ p /\ (subtrm (Lambda x M) A p’)).
Implicit Arguments bound_in.
Definition bound_in_ (t a: q0_type) (x: Var t) (A: Trm a) (p: Pos):=
(var_in_ x A p /\
exists p’, exists t2:q0_type, exists M: Trm t2,
prefix p’ p /\ (subtrm (Lambda x M) A p’)).
Implicit Arguments bound_in_.
Inductive replace_all :
forall a b, Var a -> Trm a -> Trm b -> Trm b -> Prop :=
ra_eqvar : forall a x A,
replace_all a a x A (_v x) A
| ra_diffvar : forall a b x A y,
diffvar x y ->
replace_all a b x A (_v y) (_v y)
| ra_const : forall a b x A c,
replace_all a b x A (_c c) (_c c)
| ra_lambda_eqvar : forall a b x A M,
replace_all a (Fun b a) x A (Lambda x M) (Lambda x M)
| ra_lambda_diffvar : forall a b c x A y M M’,
diffvar x y ->
replace_all a b x A M M’ ->
replace_all a (Fun b c) x A (Lambda y M) (Lambda y M’)
| ra_apply : forall a b c x A M N M’ N’,
replace_all a (Fun b c) x A M M’ ->
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replace_all a c x A N N’ ->
replace_all a b x A (Apply M N) (Apply M’ N’).
Implicit Arguments replace_all.
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Logical Operators and Abbreviations
Definition Equals (t : q0_type)
:= fun (A:Trm t)(B:Trm t) => Apply (Apply (Q t) A) B.
Implicit Arguments Equals.
Definition Equiv
:= fun (A B:Trm O) => Apply (Apply (Q O) A) B.
Definition True := Equals (Q O) (Q O).
Definition False
:= Equals (Lambda (V O) True) (Lambda (V O) (_v (V O))).
Definition Pi (t : q0_type)
:= Apply (Q (Fun O t)) (Lambda (V t) True).
Definition Forall (t : q0_type)
:= fun (x : Var t)(A:Trm O) => Apply (Pi t) (Lambda x A).
Definition g_ooo := V (Fun (Fun O O) O).
Definition x_o := V O.
Definition y_o := V_ O 1.
Definition And_
:= Lambda x_o (Lambda y_o
(Equals (Lambda g_ooo
(Apply (Apply (_v g_ooo) True) True))
(Lambda g_ooo
(Apply (Apply (_v g_ooo) (_v x_o)) (_v y_o))))).
Definition And := (fun (A B:Trm O) => Apply (Apply And_ A) B).
Definition Implies_
:= Lambda x_o (Lambda y_o
(Equals (_v x_o) (And (_v x_o) (_v y_o)))).
Definition Implies
:= (fun (A B:Trm O) => Apply (Apply Implies_ A) B).
(* Abbreviations contd: De Morgan’s *)
Definition Not_ := Apply (Q O) False.
Definition Not := fun (A:Trm O) => Apply Not_ A.
Definition Or_
:= Lambda x_o (Lambda y_o
(Not (And (Not (_v x_o)) (Not (_v y_o))))).
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Definition Or := fun (A B:Trm O) => Apply (Apply Or_ A) B.
Definition Exists (t : q0_type)
:= fun (x : Var t)(A : Trm O) => Not (Forall t x (Not A)).
Definition Neq (t : q0_type)
:= fun (A B : Trm O) => Not (Equals A B).
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The Axioms of Q0
Variable Pf : Trm O -> Set.
Definition g_oo := V (Fun O O).
Definition x_a (a : q0_type) := V a.
Definition y_a (a : q0_type) := V_ a 1.
Definition h_oa (a : q0_type) := V (Fun O a).
(* Law of Bivalence *)
Axiom axiom_1 :
Pf (Equals (And (Apply (_v g_oo) True) (Apply (_v g_oo) False))
(Forall O x_o (Apply (_v g_oo) (_v x_o)))).
Axiom axiom_2a : forall (a : q0_type),
Pf (Implies (Equals (_v (x_a a)) (_v (y_a a)))
(Equals (Apply (_v (h_oa a)) (_v (x_a a)))
(Apply (_v (h_oa a)) (_v (y_a a))))).
Definition f_ab (a b : q0_type) := V (Fun a b).
Definition g_ab (a b : q0_type) := V_ (Fun a b) 1.
(* Axiom of Extensionality *)
Axiom axiom_3ab : forall (a b : q0_type),
Pf (Equals (Equals (_v (f_ab a b)) (_v (g_ab a b)))
(Forall _ (x_a b)
(Equals (Apply (_v (f_ab a b)) (_v (x_a b)))
(Apply (_v (g_ab a b)) (_v (x_a b)))))).
(* Beta-reduction in Q0 *)
Axiom axiom_41v : forall a b : q0_type, forall x : Var a,
forall A : Trm a, forall v: Var b,
diffvar x v ->
Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x (_v v)) A) (_v v))).
Axiom axiom_41c : forall a b : q0_type, forall x : Var a,
forall A : Trm a, forall c : Const b,
Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x (_c c)) A) (_c c)).
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Axiom axiom_42 : forall a : q0_type,
forall x : Var a, forall A : Trm a,
Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x (_v x)) A) A).
Axiom axiom_43 : forall a b g x, forall B : Trm (Fun b g),
forall C, forall (A : Trm a),
Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x (Apply B C)) A)
(Apply (Apply (Lambda x B) A)
(Apply (Lambda x C) A))).
Axiom axiom_44 : forall a g d, forall x : Var a, forall y : Var g,
forall B : Trm d, forall A,
diffvar y x ->
~ (occurs y A) ->
Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x (Lambda y B)) A)
(Lambda y (Apply (Lambda x B) A))).
Axiom axiom_45: forall a d, forall x : Var a,
forall B : Trm d, forall A,
Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x (Lambda x B)) A) (Lambda x B)).
(* Axiom of Descriptions / Axiom of Unique Choice *)
Axiom axiom_5 : forall y,
Pf (Equals (Apply Iota (Apply (Q I) y)) y).
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Syntactic Lemmas and Tactics
Axiom projS2_eq :
forall (A : Set)(P : A -> Set)(x : A) (p1 p2 : P x),
existS P x p1 = existS P x p2 -> p1 = p2.
Ltac existS_tac H :=
let x := type of H in
match x with
existS ?F ?T ?T1 = existS ?F ?T ?T2 =>
assert (T1 = T2);
[apply (projS2_eq q0_type F T T1 T2); assumption | idtac ];
clear H
end.
Ltac rm_existS_tac :=
match goal with
| H: existS ?f ?tp ?T = existS ?f ?tp ?T |- _ =>
clear H; try rm_existS_tac
| H1: ?tp1 = ?tp2,
H2: existS _ ?tp1 (existS _ _ _) =
existS _ ?tp2 (existS _ _ _) |- _ =>
subst tp1; existS_tac H2; try rm_existS_tac
| H: existS _ _ (existS _ _ _) =
existS _ _ (existS _ _ _) |- _ =>
existS_tac H; try rm_existS_tac
| H1: ?tp1 = ?tp2, H2: existS _ ?tp1 ?T1 = existS _ ?tp2 ?T2 |- _ =>
subst tp1; existS_tac H2; subst T1; try rm_existS_tac
| H: existS _ _ ?T1 = existS _ _ ?T2 |- _ =>
existS_tac H; subst T1; try rm_existS_tac
end.
Lemma prefix_p_empty :
forall p, prefix p empty -> p = empty.
Proof.
intro.
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case p; intros.
trivial.
elimtype Logic.False.
inversion H.
elimtype Logic.False.
inversion H.
Qed.
Lemma disjoint_empty :
forall p, ~ (disjoint empty p).
Proof.
unfold disjoint.
intros p [H1 H2].
apply H1; exact (prefix_empty p).
Qed.
Lemma disjoint_symm :
forall p1 p2, disjoint p1 p2 -> disjoint p2 p1.
Proof.
unfold disjoint; intros p1 p2 [H1 H2].
auto.
Qed.
Lemma disjoint_0 :
forall p1 p2, disjoint (P0 p1) (P0 p2) -> disjoint p1 p2.
Proof.
unfold disjoint.
intros p1 p2 [np1 np2].
split; intro.
apply np1.
exact (prefix_0 p1 p2 H).
apply np2.
exact (prefix_0 p2 p1 H).
Qed.
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Lemma disjoint_1 :
forall p1 p2, disjoint (P1 p1) (P1 p2) -> disjoint p1 p2.
intros p1 p2 [np1 np2].
split; intro.
apply np1.
exact (prefix_1 p1 p2 H).
apply np2.
exact (prefix_1 p2 p1 H).
Qed.
Lemma replace_empty :
forall a, forall A B : Trm a, replace A B empty A B.
Proof.
unfold replace.
intros; split.
apply subtrm_empty.
split.
apply subtrm_empty.
intros.
elimtype Logic.False;
exact (disjoint_empty p’ H).
Qed.
Lemma replace_apply0 :
forall a, forall A B : Trm a, forall p,
forall b c, forall M1 M2 : Trm (Fun b c), forall N : Trm c,
replace A B p M1 M2 -> replace A B (P0 p) (Apply M1 N) (Apply M2 N).
Proof.
unfold replace.
intros a A B p b c M1 M2 N [H1 [H2 H3]].
split.
exact (subtrm_apply0 b c a M1 N A p H1).
split.
exact (subtrm_apply0 b c a M2 N B p H2).
intro p1; case p1.
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intro.
elimtype Logic.False.
apply (disjoint_empty (P0 p)).
apply disjoint_symm; assumption.
intros.
assert (disjoint p p0).
apply disjoint_0; assumption.
assert (subtrm Q0 M1 p0 <-> subtrm Q0 M2 p0).
exact (H3 p0 H0 q Q0).
elim H4.
intros.
split; intro; apply subtrm_apply0.
apply H5.
inversion H7.
inversion H8; simpl.
subst b0.
assert (M = M1).
rm_existS_tac; trivial.
rm_existS_tac; assumption.
inversion H7.
rm_existS_tac.
apply H6; assumption.
intros.
split; intro; apply subtrm_apply1;
inversion H0; simpl;
inversion H4; simpl; assumption.
Qed.
Lemma replace_apply1 :
forall a, forall A B : Trm a, forall p,
forall b c, forall M : Trm (Fun b c), forall N1 N2 : Trm c,
replace A B p N1 N2 ->
replace A B (P1 p) (Apply M N1) (Apply M N2).
Proof.
unfold replace.
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intros a A B p b c M N1 N2 [H1 [H2 H3]].
split.
apply subtrm_apply1; assumption.
split.
apply subtrm_apply1; assumption.
intro p1; case p1.
intro.
elimtype Logic.False.
apply (disjoint_empty (P1 p)).
apply disjoint_symm; assumption.
Focus 2.
intros.
assert (disjoint p p0).
apply disjoint_1; assumption.
assert (subtrm Q0 N1 p0 <-> subtrm Q0 N2 p0).
exact (H3 p0 H0 q Q0).
elim H4.
intros.
split; intro; apply subtrm_apply1.
apply H5.
inversion H7; simpl.
inversion H8; simpl.
assumption.
apply H6.
inversion H7; simpl.
inversion H8; simpl.
assumption.
intros.
split; intro; apply subtrm_apply0;
inversion H0; inversion H4; simpl.
rm_existS_tac; assumption.
rm_existS_tac; assumption.
Qed.
Lemma replace_lambda1 :
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forall a, forall A B : Trm a, forall p,
forall b c, forall x : Var b, forall N1 N2 : Trm c,
replace A B p N1 N2 ->
replace A B (P1 p) (Lambda x N1) (Lambda x N2).
Proof.
unfold replace.
intros a A B p b c M N1 N2 [H1 [H2 H3]].
split.
apply subtrm_lambda1; assumption.
split.
apply subtrm_lambda1; assumption.
intro p1; case p1.
intro.
elimtype Logic.False.
apply (disjoint_empty (P1 p)).
apply disjoint_symm; assumption.
Focus 2.
intros.
assert (disjoint p p0).
apply disjoint_1; assumption.
assert (subtrm Q0 N1 p0 <-> subtrm Q0 N2 p0).
exact (H3 p0 H0 q Q0).
elim H4.
intros.
split; intro; apply subtrm_lambda1.
apply H5.
inversion H7; simpl;
inversion H12; simpl;
inversion H14; simpl;
assumption.
apply H6.
inversion H7; simpl.
inversion H12; simpl.
inversion H14; simpl.
assumption.
48
intros.
split; intro; apply subtrm_lambda0;
inversion H0;
inversion H4; simpl;
subst b0.
inversion H8; simpl.
inversion H9; simpl.
assumption.
inversion H8; simpl.
inversion H9; simpl; assumption.
Qed.
Ltac replace_tac :=
match goal with
| |- replace _ _ empty _ _ =>
apply replace_empty; replace_tac
| |- replace _ _ (P0 ?p) (Apply _ _) (Apply _ _) =>
apply replace_apply0; replace_tac
| |- replace _ _ (P1 ?p) (Apply _ _) (Apply _ _) =>
apply replace_apply1; replace_tac
| |- replace _ _ (P1 ?p) (Lambda _ _) (Lambda _ _) =>
apply replace_lambda1; replace_tac
end.
Lemma pos_non_binding_empty :
forall a, forall A : Trm a, ~ (pos_binding empty A).
Proof.
repeat intro.
elim H; intros.
elim H0; intros.
elim H1; intros.
elim H2; intros.
elim H3; intros.
elim H4.
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intros.
inversion H5.
Qed.
Lemma pos_non_binding_apply0 :
forall p s t, forall M : Trm (Fun s t), forall N,
~ (pos_binding p M) ->
~ (pos_binding (P0 p) (Apply M N)).
Proof.
unfold pos_binding.
intros p s t M N H [p2 [s0 [t0 [x [M0 [H1 H2]]]]]].
apply H.
inversion H1.
subst p2.
elimtype Logic.False.
inversion H2.
rewrite H6 in H8; discriminate.
subst p2.
exists p1; exists s0; exists t0; exists x; exists M0.
split.
assumption.
inversion H2.
inversion H3; simpl.
rm_existS_tac; assumption.
Qed.
Lemma pos_non_binding_apply1 :
forall p s t, forall M : Trm (Fun s t), forall N,
~ (pos_binding p N) ->
~ (pos_binding (P1 p) (Apply M N)).
Proof.
unfold pos_binding.
intros p s t M N H [p2 [s0 [t0 [x [M0 [H1 H2]]]]]].
apply H.
inversion H1.
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subst p2.
exists p1; exists s0; exists t0; exists x; exists M0.
split.
assumption.
inversion H2; simpl.
inversion H3; simpl.
assumption.
Qed.
Lemma pos_non_binding_lambda1 :
forall p s t, forall x : Var s, forall N : Trm t,
~ (pos_binding p N) ->
~ (pos_binding (P1 p) (Lambda x N)).
Proof.
unfold pos_binding.
intros p s t M N H [p2 [s0 [t0 [x [M0 [H1 H2]]]]]].
apply H.
inversion H1.
subst p2.
exists p1; exists s0; exists t0; exists x; exists M0.
split.
assumption.
inversion H2; simpl.
inversion H8; simpl.
inversion H10; simpl.
assumption.
Qed.
Ltac pos_non_binding_tac :=
match goal with
| |- ~ (pos_binding empty ?A) =>
apply pos_non_binding_empty
| |- ~ (pos_binding (P0 ?p) (Apply ?M ?N)) =>
apply pos_non_binding_apply0; pos_non_binding_tac
| |- ~ (pos_binding (P1 ?p) (Apply ?M ?N)) =>
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apply pos_non_binding_apply1; pos_non_binding_tac
| |- ~ (pos_binding (P1 ?p) (Lambda ?x ?N)) =>
apply pos_non_binding_lambda1; pos_non_binding_tac
end.
Lemma pos_binding_apply0 :
forall p s t, forall M : Trm (Fun s t), forall N,
pos_binding p M ->
pos_binding (P0 p) (Apply M N) .
Proof.
unfold pos_binding.
intros.
elim H; intros.
elim H; intros.
elim H1; intros.
elim H2; intros.
elim H3; intros.
elim H4. intros x4 [H5 H6].
exists (P0 x0).
exists x1.
exists x2.
exists x3.
exists x4.
split.
exact (pos_left_0 _ _ H5).
exact (subtrm_apply0 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ H6).
Qed.
Lemma pos_binding_apply1 :
forall p s t, forall M : Trm (Fun s t), forall N,
pos_binding p N ->
pos_binding (P1 p) (Apply M N).
Proof.
unfold pos_binding.
intros.
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elim H; intros.
elim H0; intros.
elim H1; intros.
elim H2; intros.
elim H3. intros x3 [H4 H5].
exists (P1 x).
exists x0; exists x1; exists x2; exists x3.
split.
exact (pos_left_1 _ _ H4).
exact (subtrm_apply1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ H5).
Qed.
Lemma pos_binding_lambda1 :
forall p s t, forall x : Var s, forall M : Trm t,
pos_binding p M ->
pos_binding (P1 p) (Lambda x M).
Proof.
unfold pos_binding.
intros.
elim H; intros.
elim H0; intros.
elim H1; intros.
elim H2; intros.
elim H3. intros x4 [H4 H5].
exists (P1 x0).
exists x1; exists x2; exists x3; exists x4.
split.
exact (pos_left_1 _ _ H4).
exact (subtrm_lambda1 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ H5).
Qed.
Lemma pos_binding_lambda0 :
forall s t, forall x : Var s, forall M : Trm t,
pos_binding (P0 empty) (Lambda x M).
Proof.
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intros.
unfold pos_binding.
exists empty; exists s; exists t; exists x; exists M.
split.
exact pos_left_empty.
exact (subtrm_empty _ (Lambda x M)).
Qed.
Ltac pos_binding_tac :=
match goal with
| |- pos_binding (P0 ?p) (Apply ?M ?N) =>
apply pos_binding_apply0; pos_binding_tac
| |- pos_binding (P1 ?p) (Apply ?M ?N) =>
apply pos_binding_apply1; pos_binding_tac
| |- pos_binding (P0 ?p) (Lambda ?x ?M) =>
apply pos_binding_lambda0; pos_binding_tac
| |- pos_binding (P1 ?p) (Lambda ?x ?M) =>
apply pos_binding_lambda1
end.
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Inference Rules: Rule R and Rule R’
Axiom Rule_R :
forall a, forall A B : Trm a, forall p C D,
Pf C ->
Pf (Equals A B) ->
replace A B p C D ->
~ pos_binding p C ->
Pf D.
Implicit Arguments Rule_R [a A B C D].
Variable Hyp : Set.
Variable null_Hyp : Hyp.
Variable in_Hyp : Trm O -> Hyp -> Prop.
Variable HypPf : Hyp -> Trm O -> Set.
Axiom by_assumption: forall A H, in_Hyp A H -> HypPf H A.
Implicit Arguments by_assumption.
Axiom weaken : forall A H, Pf A -> HypPf H A.
Implicit Arguments weaken.
Definition R’_var_condition
(a : q0_type)(A B : Trm a)(p : Pos)(C : Trm O) (H : Hyp) :=
forall p2,
prefix p2 p /\ diffpos p2 p -> (*p2 is a proper prefix of p*)
forall b g, forall x : Var b, forall E : Trm g,
~ subtrm (Lambda x E) C p2 \/
(forall h, in_Hyp h H -> ~ free x h) \/
~ free x (Equals A B).
Implicit Arguments R’_var_condition.
Lemma R’_var_condition_lem :
forall a : q0_type, forall A B : Trm a, forall p : Pos,
forall C : Trm O, forall H : Hyp,
(forall p2,
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prefix p2 p /\ diffpos p2 p ->
forall b g, forall x : Var b, forall E : Trm g,
~ subtrm (Lambda x E) C p2) ->
R’_var_condition A B p C H.
Proof.
intros.
unfold R’_var_condition.
repeat intro; left.
apply H0.
assumption.
Qed.
Axiom Rule_R’ :
forall H, forall a, forall A B : Trm a, forall C D p,
HypPf H (Equals A B) ->
HypPf H C ->
replace A B p C D ->
~ pos_binding p C ->
R’_var_condition A B p C H ->
HypPf H D.
Implicit Arguments Rule_R’ [H a A B C D].
Ltac prefix_tac :=
match goal with
| H: ~ eqpos _ _ |- _ =>
elimtype Logic.False; apply H; apply eqpos_empty; try prefix_tac
| |- ~ eqpos _ _ -> prefix _ _ -> _ => intro; intro; try prefix_tac
| H: (?p = empty) |- _ => subst p; try prefix_tac
| H: prefix empty _ |- _ => clear H; try prefix_tac
| H: (_ = _) |- _ => clear H; try prefix_tac
| |- (?p = empty) =>
apply (prefix_p_empty p); assumption; try prefix_tac
| H: prefix ?p empty |- _ =>
assert (p = empty); try prefix_tac
| H: prefix (P1 _) (P0 _) |- _ =>
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elimtype Logic.False; inversion H; try prefix_tac
| H: prefix (P0 _) (P1 _) |- _ =>
elimtype Logic.False; inversion H; try prefix_tac
| H: prefix (P1 ?p1) (P1 ?p2), H2: ~ eqpos (P1 ?p1) (P1 ?p2) |- _ =>
inversion H; clear H; assert (~eqpos p1 p2);
[intro; apply H2; apply eqpos_1; assumption | idtac];
clear H2; try prefix_tac
| H: prefix (P0 ?p1) (P0 ?p2), H2: ~ eqpos (P0 ?p1) (P0 ?p2) |- _ =>
inversion H; clear H; assert (~eqpos p1 p2);
[intro; apply H2; apply eqpos_0; assumption | idtac];
clear H2; try prefix_tac
| H: prefix ?p _, H2: ~ eqpos ?p _ |- _ =>
generalize H; generalize H2; case p; clear H H2; try prefix_tac
end.
Ltac R’_var_cond_tac :=
match goal with
| p : Pos |- _ => clear p; try R’_var_cond_tac
| |- R’_var_condition _ _ _ _ _ =>
unfold R’_var_condition; unfold diffpos; try R’_var_cond_tac
| |- forall p: Pos, prefix _ _ /\ _ _ -> _ =>
intros _p [_H1 _H2]; try prefix_tac; try R’_var_cond_tac
| |- forall p: Pos, ~eqpos _ _ -> prefix _ _ -> _ =>
intros _p _H1 _H2; try prefix_tac; try R’_var_cond_tac
| |- forall _ _ _ _, ~ subtrm _ _ empty \/ _ =>
repeat intro; left; intro _H; inversion _H; try R’_var_cond_tac
| |- forall _ _ _ _, ~ subtrm _ _ (P1 ?p) \/ _ =>
repeat intro; left; intro _H; try R’_var_cond_tac
| |- forall _ _ _ _, ~ subtrm _ _ (P0 ?p) \/ _ =>
repeat intro; left; intro _H; try R’_var_cond_tac
| H1: existS _ _ ?A = existS _ _ ?T1,
H2: existS _ _ ?A = existS _ _ ?T2 |- _ =>
rewrite H1 in H2; discriminate
| H: subtrm (Lambda _ _) (Apply _ _) empty |- Logic.False =>
inversion H; try R’_var_cond_tac
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| H:subtrm ?A (Apply ?B _) (P0 ?p) |- Logic.False =>
assert (subtrm A B p); inversion H; simpl; try R’_var_cond_tac
| H:subtrm ?A (Apply _ ?B) (P1 ?p) |- Logic.False =>
assert (subtrm A B p); inversion H; simpl; try R’_var_cond_tac
| H: existS _ _ _ = existS _ _ _ |- _ =>
rm_existS_tac; assumption
end.
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The Meta-Theorems of Q0
(* Reflexivity of Equality *)
Theorem Thm5200 :
forall a, forall A : Trm a, Pf (Equals A A).
Proof.
intros.
assert (Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda (x_a a) (_v (x_a a))) A) A)).
apply axiom_42.
refine (Rule_R (P0 (P1 empty)) H H _ _); unfold Equals.
replace_tac.
pos_non_binding_tac.
Qed.
Implicit Arguments Thm5200.
(* Other basic properties of Equality *)
Theorem Thm5201b :
forall H, forall a, forall A B : Trm a,
HypPf H (Equals A B) ->
HypPf H (Equals B A).
Proof.
intros.
assert (HypPf H (Equals A A)).
apply (weaken H (Thm5200 A)).
refine (Rule_R’ (P0 (P1 empty)) H0 H1 _ _ _); unfold Equals.
replace_tac.
pos_non_binding_tac.
R’_var_cond_tac.
Qed.
Theorem Thm5201c :
forall H, forall a, forall A B C : Trm a,
HypPf H (Equals A B) ->
HypPf H (Equals B C) ->
HypPf H (Equals A C).
Proof.
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intros.
refine (Rule_R’ (P1 empty) H1 H0 _ _ _); unfold Equals.
replace_tac.
pos_non_binding_tac.
R’_var_cond_tac.
Qed.
Theorem Thm5201d :
forall H, forall a b, forall A B : Trm (Fun a b), forall C D : Trm b,
HypPf H (Equals A B) ->
HypPf H (Equals C D) ->
HypPf H (Equals (Apply A C) (Apply B D)).
Proof.
intros.
assert (HypPf H (Equals (Apply A C) (Apply A C))).
apply (weaken H (Thm5200 (Apply A C))).
assert (HypPf H (Equals (Apply A C) (Apply B C))).
refine (Rule_R’ (P1 (P0 empty)) H0 H2 _ _ _); unfold Equals.
replace_tac.
pos_non_binding_tac.
R’_var_cond_tac.
refine (Rule_R’ (P1 (P1 empty)) H1 H3 _ _ _); unfold Equals.
replace_tac.
pos_non_binding_tac.
R’_var_cond_tac.
Qed.
Theorem Thm5201e :
forall H, forall a b, forall A B : Trm (Fun a b), forall C : Trm b,
HypPf H (Equals A B) ->
HypPf H (Equals (Apply A C) (Apply B C)).
Proof.
intros.
assert (HypPf H (Equals (Apply A C) (Apply A C))).
apply (weaken H (Thm5200 (Apply A C))).
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refine (Rule_R’ (P1 (P0 empty)) H0 H1 _ _ _); unfold Equals.
replace_tac.
pos_non_binding_tac.
R’_var_cond_tac.
Qed.
Theorem Thm5201f :
forall H, forall a b, forall A : Trm(Fun a b), forall C D : Trm b,
HypPf H (Equals C D) ->
HypPf H (Equals (Apply A C) (Apply A D)).
Proof.
intros.
assert (HypPf H (Equals (Apply A C) (Apply A C))).
apply (weaken H (Thm5200 (Apply A C))).
refine (Rule_R’ (P1 (P1 empty)) H0 H1 _ _ _); unfold Equals.
replace_tac.
pos_non_binding_tac.
R’_var_cond_tac.
Qed.
Theorem Rule_RR :
forall H, forall a, forall A B : Trm a, forall C D p,
Pf (Equals A B) ->
HypPf H C ->
replace A B p C D ->
~ pos_binding p C ->
HypPf H D.
Proof.
intros.
assert (Pf (Equals C C)).
apply (Thm5200 C).
assert (Pf (Equals C D)).
refine (Rule_R (P1 p) H4 H0 _ _); unfold Equals.
apply replace_apply1; assumption.
apply pos_non_binding_apply1; assumption.
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assert (HypPf H (Equals C D)).
apply (weaken H H5).
refine (Rule_R’ empty H6 H1 _ _ _).
replace_tac.
pos_non_binding_tac.
R’_var_cond_tac.
Qed.
Theorem Thm5203 :
forall a: q0_type, forall x: Var a, forall A: Trm a,
forall b: q0_type, forall B B’: Trm b,
replace_all x A B B’ ->
(forall t:q0_type, forall v: Var t, var_in v A -> ~bound_in v B) ->
Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x B) A) B’).
Proof.
Admitted.
Implicit Arguments Thm5203.
Theorem Thm5204 :
forall a: q0_type, forall x : Var a, forall A : Trm a,
forall b: q0_type, forall B B’ C C’: Trm b,
Pf (Equals B C) ->
replace_all x A B B’ ->
replace_all x A C C’ ->
(forall t : q0_type, forall v : Var t, var_in v A ->
~bound_in v B /\ ~bound_in v C) ->
Pf (Equals B’ C’).
Proof.
repeat intro.
assert (Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x B) A) (Apply (Lambda x B) A))).
exact (Thm5200 (Apply (Lambda x B) A)).
assert (Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x B) A) (Apply (Lambda x C) A))).
refine (Rule_R (P1 (P0 (P1 empty))) H3 H _ _); unfold Equals.
replace_tac.
pos_non_binding_tac.
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assert (Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x B) A) B’)).
intros.
apply Thm5203.
assumption.
intros.
assert (~bound_in v B /\ ~ bound_in v C).
exact (H2 t v H5).
elim H6.
intros; assumption.
assert (Pf (Equals (Apply (Lambda x C) A) C’)).
intros.
apply Thm5203.
assumption.
intros.
assert (~bound_in v B /\ ~ bound_in v C).
exact (H2 t v H6).
elim H7.
intros; assumption.
assert (Pf (Equals B’ (Apply (Lambda x C) A))).
refine (Rule_R (P0 (P1 empty)) H4 H5 _ _); unfold Equals.
replace_tac.
pos_non_binding_tac.
refine (Rule_R (P1 empty) H7 H6 _ _); unfold Equals.
replace_tac.
pos_non_binding_tac.
Qed.
Implicit Arguments Thm5204 [a b].
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